The Industrial Organization and Regulation of the Securities Industry by Ian Domowitz
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Industrial Organization and Regulation of the Securities
Industry
Volume Author/Editor: Andrew W. Lo, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-48847-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/lo__96-1
Conference Date: January 19-22, 1994
Publication Date: January 1996
Chapter Title: An Exchange Is a Many-Splendored Thing: The Classification
and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems
Chapter Author: Ian Domowitz
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8103
Chapter pages in book: (p. 93 - 124)4  An Exchange Is a Many- 
Splendored Thing: The 
Classification and Regulation of 
Automated Trading Systems 
Ian Domowitz 
4.1  Introduction 
In  1969, a company called Instinet established  a computer-based  trading 
facility as an alternative to the exchange markets. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) responded by proposing rule 15~2-10,  a filing requirement 
for automated trading and information  systems.'  The proposed rule was the 
first direct regulatory action aimed specifically at automated trading markets. 
Since then, the growth in automated trade execution systems on a worldwide 
basis has been explosive. In the United States alone, there are roughly twenty 
such mechanisms, including completely automated exchanges, exchange facil- 
ities with automated trade execution components, and proprietary systems not 
currently regulated as exchanges.* 
Growth in regulatory initiatives and analysis with respect to this new form 
of financial market structure quickly followed. These efforts can be classified 
in four general ways. There are the obvious hardware and software concerns 
that are generic in the oversight of any computerized system. Advances in this 
area include the Automation Review Policy put forward by the SEC3  Perhaps 
less obvious are the oversight issues posed by the nature of the computerized 
algorithms themselves, which govern the trade-matching mechanism and con- 
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1. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 8661 (August 4, 1969), 34 Federal Regisrer 12952. 
2. See Domowitz (1993~)  for a listing and classification of automated trading markets. 
3. See Securities Exchange Act Releases no. 27445 (November 24, 1989), 54 Federal Register 
48703, and no. 29185 (May 15, 1991), 56 Federal Register 22490, with respect to SEC policies. 
General Accounting Office (1989) contains some additional concerns. 
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tribute to the pricing and trade allocation properties of  the price discovery pro- 
cess.J Computerized  markets  also  lend  themselves to cross-border  trading, 
raising problems of jurisdiction and ~tandardization.~  Finally, there is the ques- 
tion of  how to classify and regulate automated systems as a trading market. 
This includes such diverse issues as conformity with existing law, participant 
protection, and competition, among others. 
The market regulation problem is the focus of this paper. The microcosm for 
the discussion is the issue of SEC regulation of proprietary automated trading 
systems. The primary emphasis is on the appropriate definition of an exchange 
for the purpose of regulation and whether the exchangelnonexchange distinc- 
tion remains a viable regulatory construct. 
Some history may help to motivate these issues. Rule 15~2-10  for the regula- 
tion of propriety systems was not adopted after its introduction in 1969. It was 
determined that Instinet did not  share certain  characteristics of a registered 
exchange, although it performed the function of  an exchange with respect to 
trading  activity. In particular, it was decided that Instinet did not fit  into the 
statutory scheme contemplated for exchanges and, therefore, for exchange reg- 
ulation.6 This exhibited a decidedly institutional approach to trading market 
regulation on the part of the SEC. In fact, rule 15~2-10  was withdrawn in 1975, 
following the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, on the basis of 
institutional considerations.’  In response to increasing numbers of automated 
systems, the SEC adopted a policy of granting “no-action’’ positions with re- 
gard  to the  Securities Exchange Act’s  definition  of  the  term  “exchange”  in 
1984. 
After some experience in overseeing proprietary trading systems and objec- 
tions to the no-action approach from various exchanges, the SEC reintroduced 
rule 15~2-10  in 1989.8  Some of this experience involved decisions with respect 
to the definition of an exchange, and how this definition should be applied to 
proprietary  automated  systems for purposes  of reg~lation.~  The rule  is still 
pending approval, and its disposition, including possible amendments or even 
withdrawal, awaits the analysis to be put forth in the Market 2000 report on 
U.S.  equity markets. If adopted, the new rule would provide regulatory require- 
ments for such systems, which currently are subject to broker-dealer regulation 
4.  See, for example,  Sundel  and  Blake  (1991); Corcoran  and  Lawton  (1993); Domowitz 
5. See, for example, International Organization of Securities Commissions (1  991). 
6. Securities Exchange Act Release no. 26708 (April 18, 1989),54  Federal Register 15429. 
7. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 11673 (September 23,  1975), 40 Federal Register 
4522. Automated trading systems were to be regulated as facilities of an exchange or “association,” 
if the self-regulatory organization operated the system. Proprietary systems were to be regulated 
as broker-dealers or as securities information processors. 
8. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 26708 (April 18, 1989), 54 Federal Register 15429. 
9. See, for example, Securities Exchange Act Releases no. 2761  1 (January 19, 1990), 55 Federal 
(1993a); and 55 Federal Register 17932 (April 30, 1990). 
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and provisions set forth in individual no-action positions provided to system 
operators. 
This paper is motivated by  the following questions posed by the SEC for 
comment in the concept release of the U.S. Equity Market Structure Study and 
in the publication of the proposed rule 15~2-10.  Might the SEC usefully revisit 
how it defines an exchange, and is the exchangeinonexchange distinction still 
viable for determining the regulatory treatment for a market system? Proposed 
amendments are sought as to how Congress might redefine an exchange in 
light of  advances in automation. The SEC also is interested in whether the 
choice of designating a system as exchange or nonexchange is too limiting, in 
general. In fact, the SEC itself asks whether the classification could instead be 
based on functional attributes of  a trading market, proprietary or otherwise. 
This leads naturally to the appropriateness of adopting a standards approach to 
the regulation of automated systems.IO 
Given the nature of these questions, this paper is in the spirit of the work in 
Domowitz (1990, 1993b) on the laws and regulatory definitions germane to the 
approval of automated trading systems in U.S. futures markets. The language 
of  the law, precedents set in place by the regulatory authorities, and the nature 
of automated trade execution mechanisms are set out and compared. It will be 
argued that a functional approach to the regulation of trading markets is more 
appropriate in the face of  automation, the case resting in  part on the SEC’s 
rulings. This conclusion is consistent with the analysis of  Merton (1992) of 
financial products and intermediation and Lee (1992) on regulatory anomalies. 
A  brief discussion of  trading  systems appears in  section 4.2. Regulatory 
background with respect to the institutional players, characteristics, and proce- 
dures relevant to the questions considered here  is presented  in  section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 contains an analysis of the definition of an exchange, as distilled 
from legislative history and legal precedent. This definition currently is at the 
core of SEC regulatory policies with respect to trading systems. Examination 
of the issues that arise in maintaining this definition as a basis for trading sys- 
tem classification is contained in section 4.5. The emphasis is on exchange 
membership, liquidity  requirements,  and competition. The questions  of  re- 
definition and a functional approach to system classification occupy section 
4.6. A classification scheme consistent with the idea of  functional regulation 
is suggested, and its implications for current trading systems and registered 
exchanges are explored. 
4.2  Automated Trading Systems 
A trading system is defined by the SEC to be “any system providing for the 
dissemination outside the sponsor and its affiliates of indications of  interest, 
10. See Securities Exchange Act Release  no.  26708 (April  18, 1989), 54 Federal Register 
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quotations, or orders to purchase or sell securities, and providing procedures 
for executing or settling transactions in such securities.”” 
An automated trading system typically includes computerization of order 
routing,  information  dissemination,  and  trade  execution. The order-routing 
system brings buyers and sellers together so that they can trade. Computerized 
systems allow  the  transmission  of  real-time  market  information to a much 
larger group of potential participants than was previously possible. Automated 
trade  execution  systems  are  basically  mathematical  algorithms  that  enable 
trade  matching  without  the  person-to-person  contact  afforded  by  tradi- 
tional trading floors or telephone networks. With one exception, discussion of 
regulation of trading systems has been focused on systems with some form of 
automated execution.  I* 
An automated trade execution  system can comprise the entirety of  an ex- 
change’s  trading  operations,  such  as  National  Securities  Trading  System 
(NSTS) of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange or the single-price auction Arizona 
Stock Exchange. A system may simply be another facility of an exchange, op- 
erating in tandem with a traditional trading floor or telephone network, or after 
regular exchange hours. Examples include Retail Automated Execution Sys- 
tem (RAES) of  the Chicago Board Options Exchange,  Scorex of the Pacific 
Stock Exchange, and the after-hours crossing networks of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Finally, an automated market may be set up as a proprietary 
trading system, a for-profit entity, of which Instinet and Posit are examples.13 
Automated  trading  markets  have  a  varied  microstructure.  The following 
general divisions will be sufficient for the discussion of market definitions in 
sections 4.4 and 4.5. 
4.2.1  Trading Systems with Passive Pricing 
Automated trade matching can be based on time and order-type priorities, 
with the transaction price taken from a floor or telephone market. The trading 
system has no independent price discovery mechanism. The price may vary 
through the trading session, if the automated system operates at the same time 
as the floor/telephone  market, or may be fixed at a closing price, say, for an 
after-hours trading session. Such systems are designed for the trading of indi- 
vidual issues (equities or options) or baskets of stocks. 
11. This definition appears in the text of the proposed rule 15~2-10.  The rule itself does not 
apply to facilities of  a registered exchange, to systems in which all transactions are internally 
matched by  a broker or dealer, or to “brokers’ broker” trading systems. The rule does apply to 
clearing and settlement facilities, but the discussion in this paper is limited to trading systems with 
an execution component. 
12. The exception is Delta Government Options, which is a trading system for options on federal 
government securities, comprising a broker, a clearing agency, and a bank. It is basically a blind 
brokerage system and does not involve computer-generated executions. 
13. See Domowitz (1993~)  for a listing of automated markets and their classification into vari- 
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It is possible to automate some form of price improvement on these systems. 
Generally speaking, the computer assesses market conditions and prices the 
trade accordingly for execution, possibly at a price better than the best quote 
available at the time of order entry. All such rules depend explicitly on pricing 
and sales in another market such as the NYSE, however. For this reason, sys- 
tems with automated price improvement must still be considered passive pric- 
ing mechanisms. 
4.2.2  Limit Order Book Systems in Automated Continuous Markets 
In automated continuous markets, bids and offers are submitted continu- 
ously over time. Depending on the design of the system, transactions occur in 
one or both of two ways. First, transactions occur when the orders cross, that 
is, when the price of  the best bid is equal to or greater than the best offer. 
Market orders are allowed on some systems, resulting in an immediate cross 
if a counterparty is available in the system. Second, a trader may participate in 
a trade advertised by an existing quotation on the electronic limit order book 
by touching a button. 
There are many variations on this theme, but all such markets have a price 
discovery component. That is, price is determined endogenously within the 
system, based on order flow and the precise rules governing trade priority and 
execution. Some such systems have explicit provision for market-making oper- 
ations in the form of a two-sided quotation facility. 
4.2.3  Automated Periodic Single-Price Auction 
In automated single-price auction  systems, bids and offers are submitted 
over some period of time, and all trades are executed together at one price at a 
single point of time. The transaction price typically is calculated by maximiz- 
ing the total volume traded over possible transaction prices, given the bids and 
offers resting in the system. Bids and offers eligible for a match at the system- 
calculated price are processed into trades, subject to a set of priority rules. 
Once again, there are variations in this system structure, often depending on 
order types and order information display. Regardless, such systems are price 
discovery mechanisms, producing equilibrium prices at fixed points in time 
from order flow into the system. There typically is no provision for two-sided 
quotations. The only feature sometimes present that is in the spirit of market 
making is an order type designed to help equate supply and demand in the case 
of an order imbalance. 
4.3  Some Regulatory Background 
In the current regulatory environment, automated trading systems can fall 
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relevant for the issues addressed here, namely  broker-dealers, registered  ex- 
changes or facilities thereof, and exempt exchanges.I4 
Generally speaking, brokers make securities transactions for the accounts of 
their customers, while dealers transact for their own accounts in the process of 
handling customer orders.”  They must register with the SEC and become a 
member of  the self-regulatory organization (SRO), that is, with a registered 
exchange or securities association. Although they must comply with a variety 
of legal restrictions, their regulatory burden is light compared with registered 
exchanges, whether or not they  operate a trading  system. A trading  system 
operating as a broker-dealer does not have the statutory burden of responsibil- 
ity for real-time market surveillance, for example. Such trading systems may 
have no obligation to comply with the SEC’s Automation Review Policy.’6  The 
broker-dealer regulatory framework does not apply to system access criteria, 
terms of trade execution, or the handling of quotations.” 
The definition of an exchange is far from precise, and is the subject of sec- 
tion 4.4. For the moment, it suffices to think of  an exchange in simple terms as 
a marketplace for securities transactions. Exchanges must register under sec- 
tion 6 of the Securities Exchange Act. Registration brings with  it a host of 
regulatory  requirements,  duties,  and  responsibilities.  IR  Copies  of  all  rule 
changes must  be filed for public comment and regulatory  approval, for ex- 
ample, including development plans for automated systems. Automated  sys- 
tems operated by an exchange must comply with the principles of the Automa- 
tion  Review  Policy  and  are  subject  to  strict  surveillance  and  reporting 
14. A system may also be classified as a securities association, but such an association (e.g., the 
National Association of Securities Dealers  (NASD]) is subject to very  similar requirements as 
registered exchanges; see section 15A(b)(  It(8)  of the Securities Exchange Act. Other categories 
include clearing agency, transfer agent, and securities information processor. The first is not rele- 
vant, given the emphasis on the process of trading rather than on the clearing of transactions. The 
second involves issuance and registration of securities. The NASD has suggested that a trading 
system be categorized as a securities information processor. Registration as such is not required 
unless the trading system is first classified as an exchange or securities information processor that 
acts on an exclusive basis on behalf of a self-regulatory organization. See sections 3(a)(22)(B)  and 
1 IA(b)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
15. The law defines a broker to be “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions 
in  securities for the account of  others, but does not include a bank.” A dealer is “any person 
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or 
otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his 
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of  a regular busi- 
ness.” See sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
16. See Securities Exchange Act Releases no. 27445 (November 24, 1989), 54 Federal Register 
48703, and no. 29185 (May 15, 1991), 56 Federal Register 22490. A system operating under a 
no-action letter may, however, be required to comply with the review policies. Some broker-dealer 
systems are not subject to this constraint, however. 
17. See Domowitz (1993a) for discussion of the oversight problems involved in these areas for 
automated trading systems. 
18. See, for example, Becker, Adkins, Fuller, and Angstadt (1991) and the discussion in Securi- 
ties Exchange Act Release no. 28899 (February 28, 1991), 56 Federal Register 8377. 99  The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems 
requirements. An exchange is not allowed to seek exemption from any regula- 
tory burden on behalf of its automated trading system.I9 
An exchange may seek an exemption from registration, however, under sec- 
tion 5 of the Securities Exchange Act. Thus, an automated trading system can 
be classified  as an exchange  and can ask for exemption from the regulatory 
requirements  associated with registration. The scope for this action  is quite 
narrow, however. Exemptions are granted based on a “limited volume” provi- 
sion; that is, in the case of a “limited volume” of  transactions, it may not be 
considered practical or necessary in the public interest to regulate the exchange 
or system as an SRO. The statute provides no firm standard as to what level of 
volume would justify a continuing exemption. The guideline recently used is 
the volume of the smallest of the fully regulated national exchanges.*” 
The decision that proprietary trading systems did not fit into the statutory 
classification  of an exchange led to the regulation of  proprietary  systems as 
broker-dealers, with any additional stipulations contained in no-action letters.*I 
These conditions generally include the provision of quarterly operational data, 
notice of any material change to the system, and individually tailored require- 
ments that the SEC sees fit to impose. There is no public notice and comment 
period in the no-action process, unlike the approval process for trading systems 
operated as facilities of existing exchanges. 
The conditions imposed in the no-action approach imply only sporadic re- 
porting of trading, product, and system innovations. Proprietary systems began 
to grow in volume terms and in the number and types of securities to be traded. 
System innovation  increased  as technology  improved,  and  systems became 
more complex. Faced with these developments, some experience in monitor- 
ing, and complaints with respect  to unfair competition  under the no-action 
approach, the SEC reconsidered the problem. 
The result is the reintroduction of rule 15~2-10  for the regulation of trading 
systems, over and above the statutory requirements for broker-dealers. The pro- 
posed rule contains a variety of requirements, but it is effectively a vehicle to 
create a statutory classification (i.e., a market participant) somewhere between 
a broker-dealer and an exchange. In the proposed rule, the SEC reemphasizes 
19. This follows from the classification of an automated trading system associated with an ex- 
change as a “facility” of the exchange; see section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act. The 
statute further does not allow exchanges to be exempt from parts of the act; it is an all-or-nothing 
provision. In contrast, section l7(b)(  1) provides such exemptive authority regarding the registra- 
tion of clearing agencies. 
20. The SEC exempted seven exchanges from 1935 to 1936 on the basis of  low volume. The 
only other such action in history is the exemption of the Arizona Stock Exchange, an automated 
trading system, in 1991; see Securities Exchange Act Release no. 28899 (February 28, 1991), 56 
Federal Register 8377. The volume standard used was that of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, 
which averaged 717 trades per day with daily share volume of 1,238,241 in  1990. 
21. A no-action letter states that the SEC staff agrees not to recommend enforcement action to 
the SEC with respect to the nonregistration of the trading system as an exchange. The letters are 
not subject to judicial review; that is, they are not “orders” of the SEC. 100  Ian Domowitz 
its position that proprietary trading systems do not fit into the statutory classi- 
fication of an exchange. The commission further believes that subjecting trad- 
ing systems to exchange registration would deter innovation in trading system 
structure.22 
Renewed concern with the issue of the allocation of  regulatory  costs be- 
tween exchanges and competing systems, even under a scheme of “heightened 
broker-dealer regulation,” has surfaced, however (see SEC 1991). This has led 
to reconsideration of the definition of an exchange and the viability of  main- 
taining the exchangetnonexchange  distinction. 
4.4  The “Generally Understood” Meaning of Exchange 
The Securities Exchange Act defines an exchange to be “any organization, 
association,  or group  of  persons,  whether  incorporated  or  unincorporated, 
which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bring- 
ing together purchasers and sellers of  securities or for otherwise performing 
with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by  a stock ex- 
change as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and 
the market facilities maintained by such exchange” (section 3[a][  11, emphasis 
added). The legislative history  of the Securities Exchange Act gives the SEC 
considerable leeway in interpreting what trading systems should be classified 
as exchanges.*’ Even very recent decisions have deferred to SEC interpreta- 
tions of what the phrase “generally understood’ is supposed to mean, and in- 
vite reinterpretation  of the phrase over time.24 
There is concern that an overexpansive interpretation would make certain 
types of operations “exchanges” automatically, so it is important to clarify the 
obvious  exceptions.  The definition  specifically  does  not  apply  to broker- 
dealers operating systems that limit use to their own retail  customers. Such 
systems are considered to be simple automation of the internal trade execution 
functions traditionally  managed by  a broker-dealer.  The definition also does 
not apply to certain systems operated by brokers’ brokers for nonequity, gener- 
ally government or municipal, securities. Such a system permits dealers to ad- 
vertise their trading interests anonymously and provides a means of executing 
transactions based on those indications of interest. This type of system is ex- 
cluded from the discussion by existing law. The apparent reason for this exclu- 
22. Such language in the proposed rule was considerably reinforced in later decisions, in which 
membership requirements were cited as a large bamer to entry, and the “straitjacket” of exchange 
regulation with respect to evolving systems is mentioned. 
23. This dates back  to  1934. Congress decreed that stock exchanges could not be regulated 
under a rigid statutory definition. See “Stock Exchange Practices,” 73d Congress, 2d session, 1934, 
Senate Report 792,5. 
24. See, for example, Board of Trde  of the City qfChicago  1:  Securities cmd  Exchange Commis- 
sion, no. 90-1246 (7th Circuit, February 4,  1991). The court noted specifically that the wording 
was not “crystal clear,” and affirmed the SEC’s interpretation at the time. 101  The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems 
sion  is  the  classification  of  a  brokers’  broker  as  performing  “traditional” 
broker-dealer functions .  25 
Given these exceptions, it is possible to clarify the issues surrounding what 
is “generally understood” to be an exchange. These issues can be aggregated 
into the categories of pricing, trading conventions, access, and liquidity. The 
discussion is limited to the general definition of  an exchange, whether it be 
required to register or it obtains exemption from registration.26 
4.4.1  Price Discovery and Information in the Definition of an Exchange 
A system that does not provide trade execution facilities cannot be consid- 
ered  an  exchange. Procedures for executing transactions  include any rules, 
guidelines, or facilities for order entry and execution. Automated  execution 
facilities qualify under this definition. Execution facilities, automated or other- 
wise, even combined with price information dissemination, are not sufficient 
to qualify  a trading  system  as an  exchange, given congressional  and  SEC 
 ruling^.^' 
Execution of trades does not imply price discovery, as illustrated in section 
4.2. Price discovery is held to be an essential element of an exchange. Lack of 
price discovery is a major factor in the SEC’s decision to consider proprietary 
systems as fundamentally different from exchanges.28  The Instinet system en- 
gaged in price discovery at the time of this ruling, however, and is not classified 
as an exchange. On the other hand, the SEC determined that the Wunsch Auc- 
tion System should be defined as an exchange, in part because its automated 
procedures set an equilibrium price for sec~rities.~~  Thus, proprietary systems 
engaged in passive pricing cannot be considered exchanges, but price discov- 
ery, even combined with price information dissemination, is not sufficient to 
qualify. 
Price information dissemination is, however, a component of the exchange 
definition. The requirement does not include a transparency restriction, that is, 
25. When Congress enacted the Government Securities Act, it added the definitions of govern- 
ment securities broker and dealer to the Securities Exchange Act. Congress did not feel the need 
to create a category of “government securities exchange,” given the fact that, traditionally, blind 
brokers in nongovernment securities had been regarded as broker-dealers. See 55 Federal Register 
1899 (January 19, 1990). 
26. Typically, a determination first is made as to whether or not a system is an exchange. Once 
the determination is made, a system that is classified as an  exchange may then seek exemption 
status. See, for example, Securities Exchange Act Release no.  28899 (February 28,  1991). 56 
Federal Register 8377, particularly footnote 36. 
27. See 93d Congress, 2d  session, 1974, Senate Report 865, 4-7,  in which Congress recom- 
mended that “communications and execution” systems such as Instinet should be registered as 
securities information processors, rather than as exchanges. The SEC finally chose to regulate 
Instinet as a broker-dealer under a no-action provision; see Richard G. Ketchum to Daniel T. 
Brooks, Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft, August 8, 1986, SEC files. 
28. See Securities Exchange Act Release  no. 26708 (April  18, 1989), 54 Federal  Register 
15429. 
29. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 28899 (February 28, 1991), 56 Federal Register 
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a statement as to the degree to which prices and volumes are made publicly 
available  on  a real-time  basis.  It  does  mandate  that  the  exchange’s design 
makes buy and sell quotations available on a regular or continuous basis.  In 
fact, the SEC has gone so far as to use the publication of two-sided (simultane- 
ous buy and sell) quotations as part of its exchange definiti~n.~~ 
4.4.2  Trading Rules and Conventions in the Definition of an Exchange 
The legislative history surrounding trading systems clearly shows that hav- 
ing an arbitrary set of rules and conventions that centralize trading does not 
qualify a system as an exchange. The SEC requires that the system have either 
a formal market-maker structure or a consolidated limit order book, or be a 
single-price auction to be considered an exchange. 
An automated system clearly can fulfill any or all of these requirements. In 
practice, automated markets that have been classified  as exchanges embody 
both a market-maker system and a limit order book or employ a periodic auc- 
tion for trade execution and pri~ing.~’  If the system lacks market makers, there 
are apparent restrictions on the operation of the limit order facility. Limit order 
protection for customer orders is expected. This is a trivial detail for automated 
continuous auctions, for example, which  usually embody such protection as 
part of their design. The SEC has also objected to a limited duration for orders 
resting on the book in a system. Removal of unfilled orders at the end of a day 
is considered to be at odds with expected exchangg ~peratiom~~ 
the SEC has de- 
cided that lack of a traditional trading floor does not eliminate the classification 
of a system as an exchange. This is evident simply from the existence of the 
Cincinnati Stock Exchange and the Arizona Stock Exchange. The requirement 
is centralization of trading for the purpose of trade execution. The means can 
range from the traditional trading floor to a computer system allowing access 
across geographical boundaries. 
Negotiation facilities also are not required for classification as an exchange. 
Once again, although the courts have found that an exchange is in part defined 
as a place to negotiate transactions, the SEC has decided otherwise.34  This is 
Although the courts have occasionally ruled 
30. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 27611 (January 19,  1990). 55 Federal Register 
1890. 
31. The Cincinnati Stock Exchange essentially operates as a consolidated limit order book, but 
“designated dealers” are assigned to each security. These dealers commit to an  obligation to fill 
agency orders of limited size under certain conditions. The Arizona Stock Exchange is a single- 
price automated auction. 
32. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 27611 (January 19, 1990), 55 Federal Regisfer 
1890. 
33. In Board of  Trade ofthe Ciry of Chicago I?. Securities und Exchange Commission, the court 
held up the lack of  a trading floor as a way  in which a trading system did not fulfill the functions 
commonly expected of an exchange. 
34. See LTV  v. UMIC Government Securities, Inc., 523 Federal Supplement 819 (1981). where 
the court stated that an exchange was a place or means through which persons meet to negotiate 
securities transactions. 103  The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems 
also evident from the existence of automated systems classified as exchanges, 
which do not have negotiation capabilities. 
4.4.3  Access and the Definition of an Exchange 
Traditionally, an exchange is composed of members, who have a proprietary 
interest in the exchange. In fact, the Securities Exchange Act mandates that a 
registered (nonexempt) exchange provide for fair representation of its members 
under section 6(b)(3). 
The term “member” is defined in some detail under section 3(a)(3)B. Gener- 
ally speaking, a member is a registered broker-dealer or any person associated 
with a broker-dealer under section 6(c)( 1). Institutions that must comply with 
the rules of an exchange are also included in the definition of member for the 
purpose of regulation under the act. 
A member need not have a proprietary interest in the exchange under the 
law. Thus, an individual or institution participating in a trading system owned 
by others could still be considered a member if the system were classified as 
an exchange. 
More important, the act does not specifically prohibit an exchange from giv- 
ing direct trading access to individuals who are not br~ker-dealers.~~  Most au- 
tomated trading systems permit access to individuals or institutions that are 
not registered as broker-dealers. This does not mean that they could not be 
considered exchanges, registered or exempt. 
4.4.4  Liquidity and the Definition of an Exchange 
Liquidity is a difficult concept, and many definitions have been proposed. 
The discussion here is limited specifically to the way the SEC defines liquidity 
in the context of the “generally understood” terminology defining an exchange. 
It may  help first to clarify what  is not liquidity in the classification of  a 
system as an exchange. Liquidity is not immediacy, in the usual sense of being 
able to transact quickly and in a continuous fashion. Liquidity also is not based 
on volume  consideration^.^^ 
The SEC holds that having two-sided quotations on a “regular or continuous 
basis” is a guiding principle for liquidity, and has judged a system to be illiquid 
on the basis of a low percentage of  two-sided quotes, relative to overall buy 
and sell  quotation^.^' In this context, the SEC has virtually identified liquidity 
35. Compare section 6(b)(8) with section 6(f). See also section 6(0)(1) regarding denial of mem- 
bership. 
36. Both of these conclusions are based on the SEC’s recent decisions regarding the Wunsch 
Auction System, now known as the Arizona Stock Exchange. The commission determined that the 
system is indeed an exchange, based in part on its belief that the market fosters liquidity, hut the 
auction mechanism is periodic, not continuous. Liquidity is not immediacy. Once the commission 
reached this conclusion, it then granted a low-volume exemption from registration. Liquidity for 
the purpose of exchange definition is therefore not based on volume. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release no. 28899 (February 28, 1991). 56 Federal Regisrer 8377. 
37. See Securities Exchange Act  Releases no.  26708 (April  18, 1989), 54 Federal Register 
15429, and no. 27611 (January 19, 1990), 55 Federal Register 1890, with respect to liquidity and 
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with the specialist/market-makeddealer function, by  stating that liquidity by 
the definition above is provided only through a formal market-making mecha- 
nism.3s  This would make a formal market-making mechanism part of the defi- 
nition  of  an  exchange, in  contradiction  to  commission  statements  that  the 
market-making function could, at least in principle, be replaced by a consoli- 
dated limit order book. 
The commission has relaxed the provision of requiring two-sided quotes in 
the definition of liquidity provision in at least one case. The SEC still requires 
the entry of buy and sell quotations on a regular basis such that purchasers and 
sellers have a reasonable expectation that they can “regularly”  execute their 
orders at those quotes. The same standard is applied to “elements” of a trading 
system, most notably the mechanism for setting transaction prices. The trading 
system itself must be designed to create liquidity in the sense that buyers and 
sellers have a reasonable expectation that they can regularly execute 
For a trading system to be classified as an exchange, it must make an attempt 
to assure liquidity provision by these definitions. In the case of an automated 
system, this means that the design of  the system itself must be expected to 
create a liquid market through its rules and trading procedures. The key word 
here is “expected.” In particular,  only the likelihood that the trading mecha- 
nism would create liquidity by  the commission’s definitions is required for a 
trading system to be classified as an exchange.jO 
4.4.5  What Is an Exchange? 
It is now possible to define what is “generally understood,” at least by  the 
SEC, to be an exchange. To be classified as an exchange, a trading system must 
provide trade execution facilities; 
provide  price information in  the form of buy and sell quotations  on a 
regular or continuous basis; 
engage in price discovery through its trading procedures, rules, or mech- 
anism; 
have either a formal market-maker structure or a consolidated limit order 
book, or be a single-price auction; 
centralize trading for the purpose of trade execution; 
have members; and 
38. See, for example, Securities Exchange Act Release no. 2761 1 (January 19, 1990), 55 Fed- 
eral Register 1890. Even the discussion of an automated exchange in that reference emphasizes 
liquidity provision through the market-making function. 
39. See ibid., on the first point, and Securities Exchange Act Release no. 28899 (February 28, 
1991). 56 Federal Register 8377, with respect to trading mechanisms. 
40. See, for example, Securities Exchange Act Release no. 2761 1 (January 19, 1990). 55 Fed- 
eral Register 1890, particularly footnote 100, but this idea also appears elsewhere. 105  The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems 
exhibit the likelihood, through system rules and/or design, of creating li- 
quidity in the sense that there be entry of buy and sell quotations on a 
regular basis, such that both buyers and sellers have a reasonable expec- 
tation that they can regularly execute their orders at those quotes. 
This definition, distilled from legislative, legal, and commission decisions, 
remains flexible with respect to regulatory  action. A trading system cannot 
avoid classification as an exchange simply by omitting “particular characteris- 
tics” of  exchange markets (as generally under~tood).~’  A trading system that 
appears likely to result in a regular centralized securities market, in the com- 
mission’s opinion, would be classified as an exchange. 
4.5  The Exchangfionexchange Distinction 
The SEC has requested comments as to whether the exchangehonexchange 
distinction is still viable, given the introduction of automated trading systems. 
The purpose of this section is to examine some of the issues that arise by main- 
taining the existing definition as a basis for regulatory action. 
4.5.1  Members versus Participants 
Direct access to the trading facilities provided by an exchange has tradition- 
ally  been  limited  to  members,  who  are registered  as,  or  associated  with, 
broker-dealers and have a proprietary interest in the exchange. The technology 
behind  automated systems eliminates the need for a physical  presence,  and 
rules limiting access to a narrow class of traders typically are lessened in pro- 
prietary trading  In particular, institutional traders may deal directly 
with each other, without the need for the financial intermediation provided by 
broker- dealers. 
It was argued in section 4.4 that members need not have a proprietary inter- 
est in the system, and that direct access to a system classified as an exchange 
can be allowed to participants who are not broker-dealers. These points were 
based on a rather literal interpretation of the law and on a single precedent, the 
classification of the Wunsch Auction System as an exchange. 
Both points are more easily challenged than upheld by the SEC in main- 
taining the exchangehonexchange distinction. Institutions are members only 
for the enforcement of certain narrow provisions of  the Securities Exchange 
Act, for example. There is the question of whether interpreting section 6(f)( 1) 
as allowing institutional participation is consistent with the intent of Congress 
as expressed in section 3(a)(3)A of the act with respect to limitations on ex- 
change membership. It might also be argued that the Wunsch system is a spe- 
41. Examples given in ibid. include omission of  affirmative market-making obligations or a 
42. Complete elimination is impossible, of course, for a variety of reasons. A participant must, 
limit order book. 
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cia1 case, given the periodic  nature of  the price discovery  process,  and that 
continuous trading systems require membership in order to be classified as an 
exchange. Finally, the SEC has noted that the legal question of whether the act 
prohibits an exchange from granting direct trading access to participants who 
are not broker-dealers has not been settled (see SEC 1991). 
There are competitive questions that would arise from this prohibition, and 
from a strictly traditional definition of membership.  Exchanges would be le- 
gally limited with respect to access, while proprietary trading systems would 
not. Trading systems without members would further not be subject to the po- 
tential bamer to entry of the act’s  provision regarding fair representation  of 
members,  should they  otherwise be forced  to register  as an exchange. Ex- 
change classification and possible registration are avoided simply by a lack of 
membership, which has nothing at all to do with the actual function of trading 
market operations. 
Maintenance of  the membership requirement in  the  definition  of  an ex- 
change may further serve to create a two-tier market, splitting institutional or- 
der flow from retail customer order  It is not clear that such an outcome 
is desirable. 
4.5.2  Liquidity and Two-sided Quotations 
By its definition of liquidity in terms of two-sided quotations, the SEC virtu- 
ally forces a formal market-making  system to be an essential element of an 
exchange. Although it was noted in section 4.4 that the requirement had seem- 
ingly been relaxed to that of regular buy and sell quotations, this observation 
was based on the single precedent provided by decisions concerning a single- 
price auction. Market making is associated with continuous auction and dealer 
markets, and the SEC could make this case in its classification of continuous 
trading systems as exchanges. 
One of the functions of an exchange is to provide a basis for liquidity, de- 
fined more broadly than in the SEC’s use in classifying trading systems. Part 
of  the  SEC’s definition will  serve as a basis for discussion:  the creation  of 
liquidity in the sense that both buyers and sellers have a reasonable expectation 
that they can regularly execute their orders at those quotes. 
Liquidity might then be distinguished  in two fashions. The first is “inside 
liquidity,” which is the liquidity provided by market makers. The second is 
“outside liquidity,” which is provided by investors, institutional or otherwise.44 
Outside liquidity is provided when one investor’s position in a security is sold 
to another investor, regardless of whether the financial intermediation of a mar- 
ket maker  is involved. Inside liquidity can be important  with respect to the 
43. Some might well argue that this has happened already, in part because of the differences 
in execution costs between proprietary systems allowing direct participation by  institutions and 
exchanges that enforce the financial intermediation of  broker-dealers. 
44. See Miller and Upton (1989) with respect to immediacy and Domowitz (1995) for discus- 
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definition proposed above, but need not be required. The market must produce 
outside liquidity for the market to fulfill its basic function. 
The SEC definition is tantamount to stating that the basic function of provid- 
ing outside liquidity cannot be accomplished without inside liquidity for a trad- 
ing system to be classified as an exchange. Regulating immediacy by means of 
rules with respect to the affirmative obligations of specialists, for example, is 
indeed part of regulating trading operations. This is regulation of the market- 
making function, not of the function of producing outside liquidity. In fact, 
regulation of the market-making function does not necessarily mean that inside 
liquidity aids outside liquidity.45 
It may be the case that a market-making system does encourage relatively 
more outside liquidity than a limit order book system. Relative liquidity is not 
the issue, however. A trading system operating with a limit order book and 
without a formal market-making structure is capable of generating the likeli- 
hood of liquidity in the sense of buyers and sellers expecting regular execution 
of orders. There are many examples of such systems operating overseas.46 
4.5.3  Passive Pricing, Competition, and the Low-Volume Exemption 
Although passive pricing trading systems might satisfy most of the require- 
ments for exchange classification, the lack of price production rules out such a 
determinati~n.~’  Such systems use automation to directly appropriate quotes 
from another price-producing  trading system. The passive system then may 
operate at a lower cost relative to an exchange, because it does not bear the 
burden of the production of prices and the associated higher cost of regulation. 
Existing exchanges are unhappy about the situation, claiming unfair competi- 
tive advantage in favor of such proprietary 
It is interesting that one of the reasons given for not regulating such systems 
as exchanges is possible adverse effects on innovation and c0mpetition.4~  It is 
not clear what kind of competition is being cited, and one must look to history 
for some guidance. Following  the  1975 amendments to the  Securities Ex- 
change Act, the SEC promoted the development of the National Market Sys- 
45. Franks and Schaefer (1990) report, for example, that a large proportion of trades on Nasdaq 
are matched; that is, dealers sometimes do not complete a transaction until a counterparty has 
been found. 
46. Some such systems do embody a design detail allowing the input of  two-sided quotations, 
encouraging informal market making for profit. Some others, particularly the larger ones, such as 
the Paris Cotation Assist& en Continu (CAC) and the German Deutsche Terminborse (DTB), have 
some sort of  market making or dual-capacity dealing formalized as part of  market operations. 
Market makers on the DTB, however, must exhibit quotes on either side of the market only upon 
request, and need not do so on a regular or continuous basis. The DTB is considered very liquid, 
with over 3.7 million futures contracts and 9 million options contracts traded in 1991. 
47. Two-sided-quotation dissemination is included here. Some systems simply generate auto- 
matic quotations based directly on the prices on the NYSE. 
48. See Securities Exchange Act  Release no.  26708 (April  18, 1989), 54 Federal Regisrer 
15429, footnote 6,  for a list of such complaints from every major exchange. 
49. See, for example, Securities Exchange Act Release no. 27611 (January 19, 1990). 55 Fed- 
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tem. This concept was based on the idea that trading systems would compete 
on the basis  of  superior quotations. It follows that competition  is meant  to 
foster better price discovery. On the other hand, the diversion of order flow to 
the lower-cost producer of  the execution  service, the passive pricing system, 
can result in the inability of orders in all markets to interact with one another. 
This diversion of outside liquidity away from the price-producing market may 
then cause an erosion in the quality of price information, hence a deterioration 
of  the price discovery process.  Protection of  passive pricing systems on  the 
basis of competition, using the definition of  exchange as the excuse, may be 
misplaced. 
Fostering the development of  innovative price-producing  systems to pro- 
mote competition is a useful goal, however. The SEC believes that the costs of 
exchange regulation do not decrease linearly with volume, and that there are 
large fixed costs of compliance, especially for new systems that handle institu- 
tional order flow.")  Classification  as an exchange does not necessarily  mean 
registration  and regulation  as an exchange. New systems can be expected to 
have low volume, and the low-volume exemption can be used as a tool to foster 
price competition. Exempt exchanges can be usefully regulated under the types 
of restrictions envisioned under proposed rule 15~2-10.  Such a course of action 
is sensible, given that large volume is an important pressure for tighter regula- 
tion in the interest of protecting the overall market." 
4.6  A Functional Approach to Trading Markets 
The SEC has asked for proposed amendments as to how Congress might 
redefine an exchange in light of advances in automation. A suitable reinterpre- 
tation  might involve dropping requirements for, or restrictions on, member- 
ship, as well as eliminating the market-making requirement in the form of two- 
sided  quotations.  The commission  would  still be  left  with  the  problem  of 
passive pricing systems, forcing another look at the price discovery element in 
the definition. All in all, such a substantial redefinition could occasion a major 
revision of regulatory law in order to accommodate its application and enforce- 
ment. Perhaps realizing this, the commission also queried whether classifica- 
tion and regulation might instead be based on functional attributes of a trading 
market. The regulatory rewrite could then be oriented toward functions that 
are more stable than their associated institutions in the light of continued inno- 
vations in trading market infrastructure. 
The intent of this section is not to discuss the economic-philosophical foun- 
dations of functional versus institutional regulation, nor the regulatory dialec- 
50. See Securities Exchange Act Release no. 28899 (February 28, 1991), 56 Federul  Register 
51. This point also is made by  Lee (1992). He goes a bit farther, however, in proposing that 
8377. 
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tic and process of change associated with regulatory avoidance. This has been 
done elsewhere.52  The purpose here is to delineate some of the lines of inquiry 
with respect  to a shift from institutional to functional regulation  of trading 
systems in the face of the technical advances in trading market structure. A bit 
of general background is necessary, however. 
The SEC talks of  regulating ‘‘functional attributes,” which is in line with 
Lee (1992),  who defines functional regulation as the determination of the func- 
tions  that  require  regulation  and  the rationale  for  such regulation.  Merton 
(1992) uses the term to mean regulation  of  different products that are nearly 
perfect substitutes from the perspective of their users.53  The discussion here 
uses both  definitions,  taking the users to be participants in the trading pro- 
cewS4  Either way, regulation along functional lines would not require constant 
changes over time in the regulations surrounding trading systems as they fur- 
ther develop. 
4.6.1  Price Discovery 
Economists would generally agree that the price discovery process, with the 
associated dissemination of price information, is a primary market function. 
Trading systems that produce prices are substitutes. Regulatory initiatives that 
promote  quality  price  production  and  competitive  pressures  would  qualify 
such systems as nearly perfect substitutes. The mechanism of price production 
can vary, from automated limit order books to formal market-making systems. 
Combinations of both currently exist in both automated and nonautomated ex- 
ecution settings. Obviously, the quality of price production may still vary, and 
differential costs to the participants necessitate the usual trade-offs. 
A functional approach to the classification and regulation of trading systems 
then implies that price discovery  systems be regulated  on equal terms. The 
legal focus of inquiry will naturally shift to the definition of price discovery.ss 
This should not be too difficult  a task, however. Any reasonable  definition 
would imply that the floor of the NYSE, Instinet, Delta Government Options, 
and the periodic-auction mechanism of the Arizona Stock Exchange would be 
classified and regulated as price discovery markets. Such a determination also 
calls the exclusion of brokers’ broker systems, mentioned in section 4.4, into 
serious question. 
52. See, for example, Kane (1986), Lee (1992), and Merton (1992). and the references therein. 
53. Some of Merton’s (1992) discussion is a bit broader philosophically, giving functional regu- 
lation the perspective of taking as given the economic functions of markets and intermediaries, 
and questioning what is the best institutional structure to perform those functions. 
54. The discussion here narrows with respect to services provided by trading markets. In partic- 
ular, companies desiring listing services are classifiable as “users,” but this is considered a different 
“function,” and may possibly destroy perfect substitutability between trading systems with and 
without listing facilities from the viewpoint of the companies whose shares are traded. In any case, 
listing services can be regulated separately. Lee (1992) even makes a case for separating the listing 
function from the sponsor of a trading system on economic and incentive grounds. 
55. For example, computer-generated quotations at or at most an eighth away from “primary 
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Classification and concomitant regulation along price discovery lines helps 
to clearly answer some hypothetical questions posed by the SEC with respect 
to proprietary trading  systems.s6 For example, if  five broker-dealers  or five 
institutions developed a trading system among themselves,  would this be an 
exchange? The question is irrelevant in the context of functional regulation. If 
this system engages in price discovery, it is regulated accordingly. 
Would a price discovery  system merit different regulatory  treatment from 
one operating as a passive pricing mechanism? The answer is yes, in the sense 
of  an additional layer of regulatory oversight relative to that required for mere 
trade execution. Given the importance of price discovery to the public-interest 
mandates of regulatory legislation, surveillance of the process and rules with 
respect to price reporting are natural additional  requirement^.^' 
This does not necessarily mean that price discovery systems need operate at 
a significant handicap relative to passive pricing mechanisms. Price discovery 
systems can obtain incremental profits from the sale of price information. Pas- 
sive pricing systems cannot operate without such information, and should ex- 
pect to pay for it. The lesser regulatory burden of passive pricing systems also 
does not imply that price discovery markets will lose enough market share to 
make operating not worthwhile  and quality price discovery impossible.s8 In 
fact, the NYSE claims an increase in the percentage of  large trades executed 
on the NYSE over the past few years and best pricing, despite the proliferation 
of proprietary trading systems (see Shapiro 1995).  The price production mech- 
anism and its associated liquidity bring participants to price discovery markets. 
4.6.2  Trade Execution 
Centralization for the purpose of trade execution also is a basic function of 
trading systems. Such execution at low cost is a major motivation for institu- 
tions moving to trading systems that do not necessarily  offer price improve- 
ment through the price discovery process. The minimum quality of trade exe- 
cution in terms of price is already legally defined in terms of best quotations 
in consolidated markets. From the functional perspective,  centralization for 
trade execution can be considered a means of regulatory classification indepen- 
dent of  pricing, conditional on such a minimum pricing standard. 
Execution relates to the basic economic function of resource allocation at 
given prices, and therefore deserves a level of  regulatory  oversight.  Passive 
pricing systems as well as price discovery markets execute trades. Volume re- 
porting  requirements  are important, for example, as well as the design and 
integrity of  the system. The latter implies that the SEC’s Automation Review 
56. See Becker, Adkins, Fuller, and Angstddt (1991) for this, and other, examples. 
57. See, for example, Corcoran and Lawton (1993) and Domowitz (1993a) for additional discns- 
sion with respect to different oversight for varying levels and functions of  automated systems. 
58. Obviously, a fully specified equilibrium model of both price and nonprice competition in 
the exchange services industry would be helpful in qualifying the balance between system types 
as a function of services and costs. This model has yet to be formulated in the literature. 111  The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems 
Policy and some form of proposed rule 15~2-10  be applied in the case of func- 
tional regulation of automated trade execution. 
This is not currently the case for all execution systems. In fact, rule 15c2- 
10, which is largely oriented toward execution, is not applicable to a poten- 
tially large number of broker-dealer systems as it now stands. The functional 
perspective would discard prohibitions on the regulation of execution that are 
purely historical and apply to the institutional definition of broker-dealers. If 
the trading system executes trades, it is regulated as a trade execution system. 
This would also prevent proprietary trading systems from hiding as broker- 
dealers  simply to avoid regulation  under  something  like the proposed  rule 
15c2-  10 and the related review policies. 
Classification along the functional line of execution also means that execu- 
tion systems that do not engage in price discovery, but are currently facilities 
of registered exchanges, would be regulated simply as execution mechanisms. 
Thus, the NYSE after-hours crossing network would have equal standing with 
Instinet’s or Posit’s crossing systems. The all-or-nothing provision with respect 
to exchange regulation  would no longer necessarily be applicable. From the 
competitive point of view, currently registered exchanges could compete on an 
equal footing with proprietary trading systems in the market for passive pricing 
execution services.s9 
4.6.3  Liquidity 
There may be  a legitimate argument as to whether liquidity creation is a 
basic function of a market or a measure of the quality of the market’s product. 
The position taken here views liquidity as something to be fostered through 
regulation, but not necessarily as a line of classification that promotes different 
regulation for liquid versus illiquid markets. 
Liquidity, in the regulatory context of system classification, is embodied in 
the notion that both buyers and sellers have a reasonable expectation that they 
can regularly execute their orders at quotes resting on the system. Liquidity by 
this definition could be considered likely in both price discovery and passive 
pricing trading systems. Although good-quality price discovery and execution 
require some level of  liquidity, it is unnecessary to legislate liquidity  or the 
means of its provision. The process of trading will drive markets with too little 
liquidity  out of business and motivate additional innovation  with respect to 
mechanisms friendly to liquidity provision. 
In particular, a functional perspective need not draw regulatory classification 
lines between systems differentiated by direct outside liquidity and inside li- 
quidity that is used to promote outside liquidity.60  Merton (1992) characterizes 
59. This could introduce issues of  vertical integration into the discussion of  trading  system 
regulation, since a passive pricing system could be using prices produced by the same entity on a 
different level. 
60. This does not mean that a formal market-making mechanism does not need oversight, but 
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innovation in part by the cyclic pattern of the replacement of financial interme- 
diaries by market mechanisms, followed by  the entry of intermediaries using 
the new mechanism. Limit order book systems have replaced, or are used in- 
stead of, formal market-making  mechanisms  in  some international jurisdic- 
tions. Market makers have not necessarily disappeared, but have adapted to the 
new technology and offer services accordingly. 
4.6.4  The Question of Standards 
The SEC has requested comment on the appropriateness of a “standards” 
approach for the  regulation  of  proprietary  systems. This includes  standards 
under which  systems and system amendments  would be approved  and stan- 
dards for exemption from certain regulatory  burdens.h’ These questions are 
equally appropriate in the context of functional classification and regulation of 
trading systems. 
A standards-based approach to the approval process clearly could be bene- 
ficial, if  not too broadly  applied. Ambiguities  with respect  to the frequency 
and nature of  risk assessments, surveillance requirements, record keeping for 
system development and operations, and the like, can easily be avoided.62  Con- 
sistent application across all trading systems of the current Automation Review 
Policy is one step in this direction. A system either conforms to the standards 
or not, the determination of  which should then  speed up the regulatory ap- 
proval process. 
A  standards approach with respect  to system configuration is not  appro- 
priate. One of the avowed aims of the SEC is to encourage innovation in trading 
market infrastructure. A reinterpretation of the theoretical work of Shy (1  991) 
on international standardization suggests that the frequency of  innovation  is 
potentially much lower under a uniform standards approach to trading system 
configuration. The reason  is that  a market  structure adopted  widely  is less 
likely to be abandoned by traders, causing an incentive problem with respect 
to the introduction of new market systems.63  This problem has also been noted 
by Amihud and Mendelson (1989) in the context of SEC approval of an options 
market integration system. They characterize adoption of a certain standard in 
terms of  “technological lockup,” noting barriers to future innovation. An ex- 
oversight will depend on the classification of the system with respect to execution and price dis- 
covery. 
61. As opposed to the delineation of general categories of information that must be contained 
in those plans, for example. The exemption issue is posed in the context of exemption from ex- 
change registration. 
62. The model here is Securities Exchange Act Release no.  16900 (June 17, 1980). 45  Federal 
Register 41920, concerning clearing agency operations. 
63. This incentive problem also explains why automated systems have not made much headway 
in replacing traditional market-maker and/or open outcry auction systems in the United States, 
while automated auctions are commonplace in countries without such traditions. See Domowitz 
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ample to which their argument applies directly would be configuration stan- 
dards that effectively mandate a formal market-making mechanism.64 
It was argued earlier that fostering competition in the area of superior price 
discovery is appropriate, while such nurturing in the case of passive pricing 
systems is not in accordance with the SEC's definition of competition. A low- 
volume  exemption  for price  discovery  systems  is justifiable  on  the  same 
grounds as applied in the case of exemption from exchange registration. Large 
volume remains an important pressure for tighter regulation, all the more so 
since price discovery at low volumes is arguably less important to the overall 
price discovery function of the national market. Such a standard could, in prin- 
ciple, be unambiguously defined. In practice, however, this could be difficult. 
Lines of demarcation based on dollar volume would certainly depend on the 
particular securities traded on the system, for example. The same might be said 
for a standard including the number of market participants as a factor. 
4.7  Concluding Remarks 
If the SEC's decision classifying the Wunsch Auction System as an exchange 
is viewed as setting legal precedent, failure to reclassify some existing trading 
systems might bring about further legal action from established exchange mar- 
kets. Such action could transpire in the event of a new continuous trading sys- 
tem that satisfied the guidelines laid down in the latest decision, but that ap- 
plied for registration as a broker-dealer. Given the difficulties with redefining 
what is meant by an exchange, the SEC might be expected to justify its latest 
ruling by  appealing to the single-price auction nature of  the trading mecha- 
ni~m.~~  Legal precedent suggests that the SEC would win. 
The strict definition of an exchange in terms of membership and two-sided 
quotations has been argued to be unsatisfactory, given the advances in technol- 
ogy and the current design of  automated trading systems as exhibited world- 
wide. It is arguably the case that such systems fulfill all the trading functions 
of  an exchange, including the likelihood of  liquidity provision without two- 
sided quotations on a continuous basis. 
This observation leads to the suggestion that the exchangetnonexchange dis- 
tinction be dropped in favor of a more functional approach to the classification 
and regulation of  trading  systems. The nature of regulation  is based on the 
functional lines of centralization for trade execution and price discovery. The 
dividing line distinguishes systems that engage in price production from those 
executing transactions based on passive pricing. 
Classifying  and regulating price discovery systems uniformly, subject to 
64.  See also Domowitz (1993a) on the potential harm to liquidity from tight regulation of sys- 
tem configuration. 
65. This potential problem is consistent with the interpretation of  Lee (1992), who regards the 
Wunsch decision as a regulatory anomaly, and provides a variety of  reasons for the decision, none 
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possible volume exemptions, puts systems such as Instinet, the Wunsch Auc- 
tion System, and Delta Government Options on the same footing as the floor 
of the NYSE. The exclusion from such regulation of brokers’ broker systems, 
currently  exempted  from  exchange  classification  and  the  proposed  rule 
15~2-10  based  solely  on the traditional classification  of  such operations  as 
broker-dealers, would be considered inappropriate. 
This view would also promote the uniform regulation of execution services. 
The required oversight would still be considered less than for systems engaged 
in price discovery over and above execution. Such a uniform standard questions 
the  exclusion  of  a number  of broker-dealer  systems from regulation  under 
some form of proposed rule 15~2-10.  It further suggests that some facilities of 
established exchanges, operating as passive pricing mechanisms, be regulated 
on an equal basis with proprietary trading systems that do not engage in active 
price discovery. Thus, the NYSE after-hours crossing network would compete 
on a level playing field with such crossing systems operated on a proprietary 
basis. 
These observations have been made within the fairly narrow scope of stock 
trading systems, relative to overall financial market operations. This was con- 
sidered necessary  in order to be very specific with respect to the legislative 
details leading to the issues and the factors involved in the determination. Simi- 
lar questions are arising in the derivatives markets, however, both in the context 
of established exchange operations and over-the-counter derivative market ac- 
tivity.66  The Chicago Board of Trade is requesting an exemption from regula- 
tion as a “professional trading market,” for all instruments that would other- 
wise  be  regulated  under  the  Commodity  Exchange  Act.  The  Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange seeks regulatory exemption for its rolling spot currency 
contract, because  it has close  affinity  to cash market  instruments currently 
traded over the counter. The argument is that considerable benefits would ac- 
crue by allowing trading in this contract to operate on regulatory parity with 
the cash market. The implication of the analysis in this paper is that the estab- 
lishment of  additional statutory classifications,  in the form of “new” market 
participants, is not  necessarily  an appropriate response  to  technological  ad- 
vances  in market  infrastructure  or new  product development.  On the  other 
hand, regulation  along functional lines invites consideration of  easing some 
restrictions on established exchanges. 
66. See Bronfman (1995). for example, for discussion of  Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange initiatives aimed at exemptions from exchange regulations for certain types 
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Comment  Ananth Madhavan 
Ian  Domowitz’s paper concerns  a timely  and interesting topic.  In  a narrow 
sense, the key question posed by the paper is, what determines whether a trad- 
ing system is an exchange or a broker-dealer? The proliferation of new trading 
systems complicates  the task of regulators,  who previously relied on defini- 
tions that corresponded relatively closely to economic realities (see, e.g., Mad- 
havan [  19921 for an analysis of  various trading systems). Modem technology 
has  blurred  the  traditional  definitions  and  boundaries.  For example,  some 
crossing systems are classified as brokers, but these systems can be extended 
easily to incorporate  computer algorithms  that  make possible  some limited 
price discovery within the prevailing quotes (see, e.g., Leach and Madhavan 
[  1992, 19931 for a discussion of price discovery). Exchanges argue that regula- 
tion places an unfair burden on them and limits their ability to innovate. The 
question is a crucial one for policymakers as well as market participants. 
The answer to the narrow question proposed in this paper is that the function 
of  the  trading  system  should  determine the appropriate  classification,  and 
hence the amount of regulation required of the trading system. Just as advances 
in genetic research raise new ethical questions (e.g., can a corporation patent 
a genetically engineered mouse?), the new technologies of trading create new 
challenges for regulators and policymakers. Taking a functional approach over 
the current statutory approach makes sense, given the rapidly changing tech- 
nology. Domowitz  makes a forceful  argument  that  the functional  approach 
should be based on price discovery, and that this would promote more efficient 
regulation as well as fairness. 
However, there is a broader issue, that is, whether we need such classifica- 
tions in the first place, and if we do, how to operationalize the functional defi- 
nition proposed here. To answer the broader question, we need to step back 
and ask ourselves  about the purpose  of regulation.  F’ublic  regulation  of  the 
securities markets is generally designed to build trust in the financial system, 
by protecting investors (especially “small” retail investors who may underesti- 
mate the potential risks associated with trading securities) from defaults, fraud, 
insider trading, and market manipulation of various types. In addition, regula- 
tion also serves as a method to monitor and control financial markets, a func- 
tion that is important because these markets play  a crucial role in financing 
new  investment and allocating resources.  From this perspective,  the trading 
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systems most important for regulation are those that have the highest volume, 
where trading by  professional market participants  (e.g., market makers and 
brokers) can affect the integrity of prices. These are the systems that should be 
subject to the most  stringent regulation,  that is, regulated  as exchanges are 
today. 
But the need for regulation must be balanced against the costs imposed by 
such rules. What are these costs? There are both explicit and implicit costs to 
regulation. Explicit costs imposed on exchanges include the costs of compli- 
ance, market surveillance, reporting requirements,  and disseminating quotes 
and maintaining system access. The implicit costs imposed on exchanges by 
regulation are in terms of the limits placed on the ability to innovate because 
of the difficulty in changing trading arrangements. 
Both explicit and implicit costs are significant, but there are reasons to err 
on the side of excess. First, some of the explicit costs are for functions required 
of exchanges that might be performed anyway. For example, of the fifteen hun- 
dred or so New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) employees, roughly a third are 
involved in market surveillance required by law. However, even if there were 
no such regulations, the NYSE would  probably  still continue to devote re- 
sources to maintaining a “fair and orderly” market, simply because it is in the 
interest of  the NYSE to develop a reputation for trust. Second, the explicit 
costs of collecting real-time market information and the ability to analyze these 
data (e.g., to detect episodes of insider trading) will continue to decline as the 
technology improves. Implicit costs, however, induced by the limits placed on 
innovation by cumbersome and slow regulatory approval for new changes, may 
be significant and may be growing. These costs are largely discretionary, how- 
ever, and can be reduced by shortening the approval process. These arguments 
would suggest that we exercise some caution in terms of changing the regula- 
tory environment too rapidly in the direction of less regulation. 
Given this, how  should the functional  approach be implemented? Again, 
although I agree with the basic thrust of Domowitz’s argument, I would argue 
for caution in implementing his proposal. Extending the regulatory burden to 
small trading systems trying to develop new methods for price discovery may 
ultimately reduce the incentives for innovation. To some extent, this is the ap- 
proach practiced now. For example, the Arizona Stock Exchange, an electronic 
batch auction system providing price discovery, is exempted from the tradi- 
tional requirements imposed on an exchange because its volume is low. This 
makes sense; it allows newer systems the freedom to experiment and alter their 
trading arrangements to capture more volume without costly and lengthy regu- 
latory  oversight.  Similarly,  less  regulation  of  high-volume  trading  systems 
without price discovery may expose investors to potential risks that may dam- 
age trust in the financial system. 
In summary, the paper provides a very careful and insightful analysis, and 
raises a number of  highly important issues for further research.  Domowitz’s 
proposal deserves to be taken extremely  seriously, and his paper should be 
required reading for all those affected by this issue. 118  Ian Domowitz 
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Comment  Chris A. Hynes 
Ian  Domowitz’s  paper  focuses  on  the  problem  of  market  regulation  of 
computer-based trading facilities. After categorizing the various  systems ac- 
cording to functional criteria, he traces the history of regulatory thought and 
action concerning them. 
While discussing this history, he raises the issue of the confusion generated 
by the definition of an exchange contained in the Securities Exchange Act. This 
definition is critical to the level of regulatory burden placed upon the system, 
or exchange, as the interpretation may determine, and forms a battleground 
between the traditional exchanges and their newer competitors, the proprietary 
trading systems. 
He then  goes on to define the requirements  for categorization  as an ex- 
change, and discusses the issues involved. Two important items discussed are 
“inside liquidity” and “outside liquidity.” Inside liquidity is supplied to an ex- 
change or system by its market makers, while outside liquidity is provided by 
investors. The consistency of liquidity, and the immediacy that results from 
this  consistency,  are important  to the  SEC. However,  since market  makers 
rarely  provide enough liquidity to provide immediacy  for large institutional 
investors, and retail investors can generally satisfy their demands for immedi- 
acy through the bids and offers of market makers, is it any wonder that retail 
investors are happy with exchanges and third-market-maker executions, while 
an increasing share of institutional business is moving to trading systems offer- 
ing outside liquidity? Perhaps Domowitz should examine the significance of 
this difference between traditional exchanges and the new electronic market- 
places, even if they are classified as exchanges. 
When discussing the systedexchange attributes of passive pricing versus 
price discovery, Domowitz has the insight that, while price discovery systems 
need another layer of regulation relative to passive pricing systems, this burden 
needn’t be excessive. He also points out that the differential regulatory burden 
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alone shouldn’t cause a market share drain from one systedexchange to an- 
other. This point should be emphasized, since cross-border proprietary trading 
systems are having a difficult time gathering business, even though they have 
a dramatically  lower regulatory  burden  than the international  bourses.  The 
problem is simple: investors are reluctant to trade passively unless they have a 
price discovery system providing accurate information to the passive pricing 
system. 
Continuing the quest for the level, rational playing field, Domowitz suggests 
that separate facilities of exchanges devoted to passive pricing  structures be 
separated from the regulation of the parent and carry a regulatory burden equal 
to that of stand-alone systems with similar structure. Is it sensible, though, that 
regulatory  burdens  for systemdexchanges with electronic audit trails,  even 
with  different  pricing  structures,  should  be  substantially  different  in  cost? 
While he has previously stated that the difference needn’t be excessive, he is 
implying here that it is important enough to be a concern. He has also pointed 
out the desirability of  the low-volume exemption for new systems. Since so 
much of the regulatory burden is designed to stop fraud occurring when agency 
and principal functions are mixed, and to ensure that trading rules are followed, 
why should there be a great regulatory cost when participants are on an equal 
footing and algorithms enforce trading rules? 
This question is indirectly addressed as the article moves on to standards, 
where Domowitz points out that standards can be valuable in the approval pro- 
cess, but pose a danger to innovation in the control of  system configuration. 
According to the SEC’s definition of competition, says the author, fostering 
competition for superior price discovery is appropriate, while doing so for pas- 
sive pricing systems is not. The SEC should realize that both are quite valuable 
to the investment ecosystem. To fight competition from a passive pricing sys- 
tem, a price discovery system has to tighten its markets to decrease the price 
paid for immediacy relative to the passive market. It would help if the size 
of  markets increased to provide real immediacy to the institutional investor 
population. In this way, the existence of passive pricing systems fores the im- 
provement  of  price  discovery  systems,  and  should  certainly  be  worthy  of 
some nurturing. 
I am concerned about the article’s conclusion that regulation move to a more 
functional approach. Without major legislative overhaul, this would place pro- 
prietary trading systems with no principal-agency conflicts directly into a regu- 
latory scheme fixed years ago that contemplates these conflicts as being at the 
heart of the regulatory mission. We cannot adopt a functional approach without 
functional legislation. 120  Ian Domowitz 
Author’s Reply 
You must not say, what is this? Why is that? All things have been created for their proper 
functions. 
-Sirach  39:21 
The regulation  of  trading markets is a sensitive, even emotional, subject for 
many people. Mention of the topic itself strikes at the heart of what individuals 
and organizations believe “should be done” to organize market activity in non- 
market fashions to protect the public interest. One response is to turn immedi- 
ately to a discussion of the purpose and function of market regulation. This 
reaction was particularly pronounced in open discussion at the NBER Confer- 
ence. Opinions varied, ranging from “regulation is unnecessary” to the use of 
trading system classification as an antitrust device. 
Ananth  Madhavan  outlines the functions of  regulation  as the building of 
trust, participant protection, and the monitoring and control of market activity. 
Government regulation is thought to be necessary in support of these functions. 
Chris Hynes does not appear to disagree with the desirability of such goals, 
but believes that the market user base can be relied on as the sole regulator. I 
concur with the functional description, and have some sympathy with both of 
these positions. Both can muster theoretical support, depending on the assump- 
tions made on the underlying nature of the market and the potential for market 
failure with respect to one or more of these functions. 
My paper, however, is not about the purpose and functions of regulation, nor 
does it address the issue of “what should be” in the context of trading market 
regulation. There is already a large literature on the former, and many opinions 
exist with respect to the latter. I take as given the functions outlined by Madha- 
van, broadly interpreted. I would add only the consenting opinion that the func- 
tions of trading systems and the functions of regulation are not independent. I 
implicitly adopt the pragmatic view that government regulation of trading mar- 
kets exists and will continue. The paper concerns the nature of that regulation. 
Legislative history and legal precedent are used to develop a taxonomy of sys- 
tem classification  that is shown to be at the core of regulatory  policy. This 
taxonomy is compared to the new developments in the technology of trading 
market structure. It is argued to be weak in some respects and inconsistent in 
others with respect to its use in establishing policy, in the face of these techni- 
cal advances. Functional regulation  is suggested, in part because  it is more 
closely related to the taxonomy than is the current institutional  structure. The 
purpose of  the remainder of the paper is simply to delineate some lines of 
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inquiry with respect to a shift from institutional  to functional regulation of 
trading systems. 
Once the hurdle of  the purpose and function of  regulation is passed, the 
discussants’ broad concerns are quite similar. The issues are regulatory costs, 
competition for exchange services, and practical implementation of the func- 
tional approach along the lines suggested in the paper. 
Madhavan correctly notes the need for balance between the need for system 
regulation and costs imposed by the rules. He would discount regulatory cost 
in  the equation on the basis that much of it would be incurred anyway as a 
natural by-product of providing quality exchange services. I am inclined to 
agree, but industry participants, if not the facts, are seemingly against us. Sys- 
tem operators uniformly have made a concerted effort to avoid costs associated 
with regulation as a registered exchange. The comment letters from existing 
exchanges cited in the paper forcefully argue that the lower cost associated 
with avoiding exchange registration is a strong competitive advantage in the 
exchange services business. The SEC has made the same point, but used it as 
a rationale to promote new system development, allowing the avoidance of 
such costs through nonregistration. 
Hynes  addresses costs in the context of  an implication  of the functional 
view,  that regulatory burdens carried by electronic crossing facilities of ex- 
changes should be on the same level as that born by stand-alone systems with 
the same structure. He queries the sense in assuming that regulatory cost differ- 
ences exist. Under the Securities Exchange Act, a crossing facility operated by 
a registered exchange is necessarily subject to regulatory costs associated with 
registered exchanges. A stand-alone system is not bound by the same require- 
ments if  registered  as a broker-dealer  or under the proposed  rule  15~2-10. 
Hynes also points out that there should not be a large regulatory cost for auto- 
mated systems, when participants are on an equal footing. I agree, but the point 
is that automated systems are not currently competing on a completely level 
regulatory playing field. Further, the details of  system design may mandate 
different levels of  regulatory oversight; this point is discussed in Domowitz 
(1993). 
Both discussants mention some details with respect to the competition for 
exchange services. This is an area that deserves much more attention on theo- 
retical, empirical, and policy levels. Madhavan believes in more stringent regu- 
lation for higher-volume systems, and cites a low-volume exemption as a tool 
for promoting competition through innovation in exchange design and imple- 
mentation. I agree, and these points are discussed in more detail in the paper. 
Hynes indirectly gets to the heart of the issue of competition in the presence 
of both price discovery and execution-only markets. On the one hand, he notes 
that passive pricing trading systems require price discovery systems that pro- 
duce accurate prices. On the other, he argues that passive pricing systems are 
important to the investment ecology, and that a price discovery market must 
decrease the price paid for immediacy relative to the passive market in order 122  Ian Domowitz 
to compete. The desirable balance between these markets and the equilibrating 
forces promoting  a healthy trade-off  between  accurate  price discovery  and 
lower price for immediacy are not well understood. A fully specified equilib- 
rium model of both price and nonprice competition in the exchange services 
industry would be most helpful in qualifying the balance between system types 
as a function of services and costs. This model has yet to be formulated. Regu- 
lation cannot mandate the growth of market size suggested by Hynes as a solu- 
tion to the problem; it can only encourage it. 
The discussants also touch upon the implementation of  the functional ap- 
proach to market regulation, with seemingly different perspectives that are not 
too far apart as a practical  matter. Madhavan reiterates the point concerning 
low-volume exemptions as a policy tool, noting that the regulatory  apparatus 
is already in place for its use. The discussion of this issue in the paper further 
supports his argument. He also mentions the difficulty of deciding upon the 
demarcation between price discovery and passive pricing systems. This is a 
very  practical  concern,  requiring  consideration  of  pricing  activity  within 
quotes put out by a market that is obviously of a price discovery type. The 
issue might be resolved, for example, by  maintaining the current regulatory 
standard for price discovery in terms of quotation activity. Computer-generated 
quotations at or at most an eighth away from “primary market” quotes also 
might not be reasonably classified as a price discovery mechanism. 
The link to Hynes’s concern about implementation is that the legal focus of 
inquiry will naturally shift to the definition of price discovery. Hynes cites the 
necessity of major legislative overhaul to accommodate a functional approach, 
noting that the current system was put in place years ago. Both points are cor- 
rect and important. In fact, legal scholars at the conference termed the Securi- 
ties Exchange Act obsolete in the presence of  the technological advances in 
market structure. Discussion  in the paper notes that even a redefinition  of  an 
exchange to accommodate the current system would occasion a major revision 
of  regulatory law in order to allow its application and enforcement. In other 
words, a rewriting of the law may be necessary in any case. The paper simply 
asks whether such a regulatory rewrite might be oriented toward functions that 
are more stable than their associated institutions in the light of continued inno- 
vations in trading market infrastructure. 
Finally, the discussants both raise the issue of the level of regulation. This is 
a return to the “what should be” question noted at the beginning of this reply. 
The paper has nothing to say about the absolute level of regulation. The empha- 
sis is on the relative levels of regulation across market environments. As Hynes 
says, this is a quest for the level, rational playing field. The point is not that 
more or less regulation is needed to fulfill the goals and perform the functions 
of  regulation. Rather, a need for a shift in focus of the ways in which these 
ends are achieved in the current technological environment is the logical con- 
clusion of the analysis in the paper. 123  The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems 
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